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Abstract. Infinite time Turing machines extend the classical Turing machine
concept to transfinite ordinal time, thereby providing a natural model of infini-
tary computability that sheds light on the power and limitations of supertask al-
gorithms.
1 Supertasks
What would you compute with an infinitely fast computer? What could
you compute? To make sense of these questions, one would want to un-
derstand the algorithms that the machines would carry out, computational
tasks involving infinitely many steps of computation. Such tasks, known
as supertasks, have been studied since antiquity from a variety of view-
points.
Zeno of Elea (ca. 450 B.C.) was perhaps the first to grapple with
supertasks, in his famous paradox that it is impossible to go from here
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to there, because before doing so one must first get halfway there, and
before that halfway to the halfway point, and so on, ad infinitum. Zeno
takes the impossibility of completing a supertask as the foundation of his
reductio. More recently, twentieth century philosophers (see [Tho54])
have introduced Thomson’s lamp, which is on for 1/2 minute, off for 1/4
minute, on for 1/8 minute, and so on. After one minute, is it on or off?
In a more intriguing example, let’s suppose that you have infinitely
many one dollar bills (numbered 1, 3, 5, · · · ) and in some nefarious un-
derground bar, the Devil explains to you that he has an attachment to your
particular bills, and is willing to pay you two dollars for each of your one
dollar bills. To carry out the exchange, he proposes an infinite series of
transactions, in each of which he will hand over to you two dollars and
take from you one dollar. The first transaction will take 1/2 hour, the sec-
ond 1/4 hour, the third 1/8 hour, and so on, so that after one hour the
entire exchange is complete. Should you accept his proposal? Perhaps
you will become richer? At the very least, you think, it will do no harm,
and so the contract is signed and the procedure begins.
It appears initially that you have made a good bargain, because at
every step of the transaction, you receive two dollars but give up only one.
The Devil is particular, however, about the order in which the bills are
exchanged: he always buys from you your lowest-numbered bill, paying
you with higher-numbered bills. (So on the first transaction he accepts
from you bill number 1, and pays you with bills numbered 2 and 4, and
on the second transaction he buys from you bill number 2, which he had
just paid you, and pays you bills numbered 6 and 8, and so on.) When
the transaction is complete, you discover that you have no money left
at all! The reason is that at the nth exchange, the Devil took from you
bill number n, and never subsequently returned it to you. Thus, the final
destination of every individual bill is under the ownership of that shrewd
banker, the Devil.
The point is that you should have paid more attention to the details of
the supertask transaction that you had agreed to undertake. And similarly,
when we design supertask algorithms to solve mathematical questions,
we must take care not to make inadvertent assumptions about what may
be true only for finite algorithms.
Supertasks have also been studied by the physicists (see [Ear95]). Us-
ing only the Newtonian gravity law (and neglecting relativity), it is pos-
sible to arrange finitely many stars in orbiting pairs, each pair orbiting
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the common center of mass of all the pairs, and a single tiny moon racing
faster around, squeezing just so between the dual stars so as to pick up
speed with every such transaction. Assuming point masses (or collaps-
ing stars to avoid collision), the arrangement leads by Newton’s law of
gravitation to infinite acceleration in finite time. Other supertasks reveal
apparent violations of the conservation of energy in Newtonian physics:
infinitely many billiard balls, of successively diminishing size converg-
ing to a point, are initially at rest, but then the first is set rolling, and
each ball transfers in turn all the energy to the next; after a finite amount
of time, all motion has ceased, though every interaction is energy con-
serving. Still other arrangements have the balls spaced out further and
further out to infinity, and the interesting thing about both of these ex-
amples is that time-symmetry allows them to run in reverse, with static
configurations of balls suddenly coming into motion without violating
conservation of energy in any interaction.
More computationally significant supertasks have been proposed by
physicists in the context of relativity theory ([EN93], [Hog92], [Hog94]).
Suppose that you want to know the answer to some number theoretic con-
jecture, such as whether there are additional Fermat primes (primes of the
form 22n + 1), a conjecture that can be confirmed with a single numer-
ical example. The way to solve the problem is to board a rocket, while
setting your graduate students to work on earth looking for an example.
While you fly faster and faster around the earth, your graduate students,
and their graduate students and so on, continue the exhaustive search,
with the agreement that if they ever find an example, they will send a ra-
dio signal up to the rocket. The point is that meanwhile, by accelerating
sufficiently fast towards the speed of light, it is possible to arrange that
because of relativistic time contraction, what is a finite amount of time
on the rocket corresponds to an infinite amount of time on the earth. The
general observation is that by means of such communication between
two reference frames, what corresponds to an infinite search can be com-
pleted in a finite amount of time.
Even more complicated arrangements, with rockets flying around
rockets, can be arranged to solve more complicated number theoretic
questions. And more complicated relativistic spacetimes can be (mathe-
matically) constructed to avoid the unpleasantness of infinite acceleration
required in the rocket examples above (see [Pit90]).
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These computational examples speak to Church’s thesis, the widely
accepted philosophical principle that the classical theory of computabil-
ity has correctly captured the notion of what it means to be computable.
Because the relativistic rocket examples provide algorithms for comput-
ing functions, such as the halting problem, that are not computable by
Turing machines, one can view them as refuting Church’s thesis. Sup-
porters of this view emphasize that when thinking about what is in prin-
ciple computable, we must attend to the computational power available to
us as a consequence of the fact that we live in a relativistic or quantum-
mechanical universe. To ignore this power is to pretend that we live in
a Newtonian world. Another simpler argument against Church’s thesis
consists of the observation that a particle undergoing Brownian motion
can be used to generate a random bit stream that we have no reason to
think is recursive. Therefore, proponents argue, we have no reason to
believe Church’s thesis.
Apart from the question of what one can actually compute in this
world, whether Newtonian or relativistic or quantum-mechanical, math-
ematicians are interested in what in principle a supertask can accom-
plish. Buchi [Buc62] and others initiated the study of ω-automata and
Buchi machines, involving automata and Turing machine computations
of length ω which accept or reject infinite input. Moving to a higher level
in the hierarchy, Gerald Sacks and many others (see [Sac90]) founded the
field of higher recursion theory, including α-recursion and E-recursion,
a huge body of work analyzing computation on infinite objects. Blum,
Shub and Smale [BSS89] have presented a model of computation on the
real numbers, a kind of flowchart machine where the basic units of com-
putation consist of real numbers, in full glorious precision. Apart from
this previous mathematical work, I would like to propose here a new
model of infinitary computability: infinite time Turing machines. This
model offers the strong computational power of higher recursion theory
while remaining very close in spirit to the computability concept of ordi-
nary Turing machines.
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2 Infinite time Turing machines
I propose to extend the Turing machine concept to transfinite ordinal
time, thereby providing a natural model for infinitary computability.1 The
idea is to allow somehow a Turing machine to compute for infinitely
many steps, while preserving the information produced up to that point.
So let me explain specifically how the machines work. The machine
hardware is identical to a classical Turing machine, with a head moving
back and forth reading and writing zeros and ones on a tape according to
the rigid instructions of a finite program, with finitely many states. What
is new is the transfinite behavior of the machine, behavior providing a
natural theory of computation on the reals that directly generalizes the
classical finite theory to the transfinite. For convenience, the machines
input:
scratch:
output:
start
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Fig. 1. An infinite time Turing machine: the computation begins
have three tapes—one for the input, one for scratch work and one for
the output—and the computation begins with the input written out on
the input tape, with the head on the left-most cell in the start state. The
successor steps of computation proceed in exactly the classical manner:
the head reads the contents of the cells on which it rests, reflects on its
state and follows the rigid instructions of the finite program it is running:
accordingly, it writes on the tape, moves the head one cell to the left or
the right or not at all and switches to a new state. Thus, the classical
procedure determines the configuration of the machine at stage α + 1,
given the configuration at any stage α.
1 Infinite time Turing machines were originally defined by Jeff Kidder in 1990, and he and I
worked out the early theory together while we were graduate students at UC Berkeley. Later,
Andy Lewis and I solved some of the early questions, and presented a complete introduction
in [HL00], later solving Post’s problem for supertasks in [HL]. Benedikt Loewe [Low01],
Dan Seabold [HS01] and especially Philip Welch [Wel99], [Wel00], [Wel] have also made
important contributions.
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We extend the computation into transfinite ordinal time by simply
specifying the behavior of the machine at limit ordinals. When a clas-
sical Turing machine fails to halt, it is usually thought of as some sort
of failure; the result is discarded even though the machine might have
been writing some very interesting information on the tape (such as all
the theorems of mathematics, for example, or the members of some other
computably enumerable set). With infinite time Turing machines, how-
ever, we hope to preserve this information by taking some kind of limit
of the earlier configurations and continuing the computation transfinitely.
Specifically, at any limit ordinal stage λ, the head resets to the left-most
cell; the machine is placed in the special limit state, just another of the
finitely many states; and the values in the cells of the tape are updated by
computing the lim sup of the previous cell values. With the limit stage
input:
scratch:
output:
limit
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Fig. 2. The limit configuration
configuration thus completely specified, the machine simply continues
computing. If after some amount of time the halt state is reached, the
machine gives as output whatever is written on the output tape.
Because there seems to be no need to limit ourselves to finite input
and output—the machines have plenty of time to consult the entire input
tape and to write on the entire output tape before halting—the natural
context for these machines is Cantor Space 2ω, the space of infinite binary
sequences. For our purposes here, let’s denote this space by R and refer
to its members as real numbers, intending by this terminology to mean
infinite binary sequences. We regard the set of natural numbers N as a
subset of R by identifying the number 0 with the sequence 〈 000 · · · 〉, the
number 1 with 〈 100 · · · 〉, the number 2 with 〈 110 · · · 〉, and so on.
Because every program p determines a function—the function send-
ing input x to the output of the computation of program p on input x—the
machines provide a model of computation on the reals. We define that a
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partial function f ...R→ R is infinite time computable (or supertask com-
putable, or for brevity, just computable, when the infinite time context is
understood) when there is a program p such that f(x) = y if and only if
the computation of program p on input x yields output y. A set of reals
A ⊆ R is infinite time decidable (or supertask decidable or again, just
decidable) when its characteristic function, the function with value 1 for
inputs in A and 0 for inputs not in A, is computable. The set A is infi-
nite time semi-decidable when the function of affirmative values 1 ↾ A,
that is, the function with domain A and constant value 1, is computable.
(Thus, the semi-decidable sets correspond in the classical theory to the
recursively enumerable sets, though since here we have sets of reals, we
hesitate to describe them as enumerable.) Since it is an easy matter to
change any output value to 1, the semi-decidable sets are exactly the do-
mains of the computable functions, just as in the classical theory.
Theorem 1. Every supertask computation halts or repeats in countably
many steps.
Proof. Suppose that a supertask computation does not halt by any count-
able stage of computation. The point is now that a simple cofinality argu-
ment shows that the complete configuration of the machine at stage ω1—
the position of the head, the state and the contents of the cells—must
have occurred earlier. For example, one can find a countable ordinal α0
by which time all of the cells that have stabilized by ω1 have stabilized.
And then one can construct a countable increasing sequence of count-
able ordinals α0 < α1 < · · · such that all the cells that change their
value after αn do so at least once between αn and αn+1. These ordinals
exist because ω1 is regular and there are only countably many cells. At
the limit stage αω = supαn, which is still a countable ordinal, I claim
that the configuration is the same as at ω1: since it is a limit ordinal, the
head is on the first cell and in the limit state; and by construction the
contents of each cell are computing the same lim sup that they compute
at ω1. Since beyond α0 the only cells that change are the ones that will
change unboundedly often, it follows that limits of this configuration are
the very same configuration again, and the machine is caught in an end-
lessly repeating loop. So the proof is complete.
Please observe in this argument that, contrary to the classical situa-
tion, a computation that merely repeats a complete machine configuration
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need not be caught in an endlessly repeating loop. After ω many repeti-
tions, the limit configuration may allow it to escape. One example of this
phenomenon would be the machine which does nothing at all except halt
when it is in the limit state; this machine repeats its initial configuration
many times, yet still halts at ω.
3 How powerful are the machines?
One naturally wants to understand the power of the new machines. The
first observation, of course, is that the classical halting problem for ordi-
nary Turing machines—the question of whether a given program p halts
on given input n in finitely many steps—is decidable in ω many steps
by an infinite time Turing machine. To see this, one programs an infinite
time Turing machine to simply simulate the operation of p on n, and if
the simulated computation ever halts our algorithm gives the output that
yes, indeed, the computation did halt. Otherwise, the limit state will be
attained, and when this occurs the machine will that know the simulated
computation failed to halt; so it outputs the answer that no, the computa-
tion did not halt.
The power of infinite time Turing machines, though, far transcends
the classical halting problem. The truth is that any question of first or-
der number theory is supertask decidable. With an infinite time Turing
machine, one could solve the prime pairs conjecture (which asserts that
there are infinitely many primes pairs, pairs of primes differing by two),
for example, and the question of whether there are infinitely many Fermat
primes (primes of the form 22n +1) and so on: there is a general decision
algorithm for any such conjecture. The point is that to decide a question
of the form ∃nϕ(n, x), where n ranges over the natural numbers, one
can simply try out all the possible values of n in turn. One either finds a
witness n or else knows at the limit that there is no such witness, and in
this way decides whether ∃nϕ(n, x). Iterating this idea, one concludes
by induction on the complexity of the statement that any first order num-
ber theoretic question is decidable with only a finite number of limits,
that is, before stage ω2. In fact, the class of sets that are decidable in time
uniformly before ω2 is exactly the class of arithmetic sets, the sets of
reals that are definable by a statement using quantifiers over the natural
numbers (see [HL00, Theorem 2.6 ]).
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Theorem 2. Arithmetic truth is infinite time decidable.
One can push this much harder to see that even more complex questions,
questions from the lower part of the projective hierarchy in second order
number theory, are supertask decidable. The fact is that any Π11 set is de-
cidable and more. To prove this, it suffices to consider the most complex
Π11 set, the well-known set WO, consisting of the reals coding a well-
orders of a subset of N. An infinite binary sequence x codes a relation ⊳
on N when i ⊳ j if and only if x(〈 i, j 〉) = 1, where 〈 ·, · 〉 is the Go¨del
pairing function coding pairs of natural numbers with natural numbers.
Theorem 3. The set WO is infinite time decidable.
Proof. This argument is known as the “count-through” argument. We
would like to describe a supertask algorithm which on input x decides
whether x codes a well order ⊳ on a subset of N or not. In ω many steps,
it is easy to check whether x codes a linear order: this amounts merely
to checking that the relation ⊳ coded by x is transitive, irreflexive and
connected. For example, the machine must check that whenever i ⊳ j
and j ⊳ k then also i ⊳ k, and all these requirements can be enumerated
and checked in ω many steps.
Next, the algorithm will attempt to find the least element in the field
of the relation ⊳. This can be done by keeping a current-best-guess on
the scratch tape and systematically looking for better guesses, whenever
a new smaller element is found. When such a better guess is found, it
replaces the current guess on the scratch tape, and a special flag cell is
flashed on and then off again. At the limit, if the flag is on, it means that
infinitely often the guess was changed, and so the relation has an infinite
descending sequence. Thus, in this case the input is definitely not a well
order and the computation can halt with a negative output. Conversely,
if the flag is off, it means that the guess was only changed finitely often,
and the machine has successfully found the ⊳ least element. The algo-
rithm now proceeds to erase all mention of this element from the field
of the relation ⊳. This produces a new smaller relation, and the algo-
rithm proceeds to find the least element of it. In this way, the relation
⊳ is eventually erased from the bottom as the computation proceeds. If
the relation is not a well order, eventually the algorithm will erase the
well founded initial segment of it, and then discover that there is no least
element remaining, and reject the input. If the relation is a well order,
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then the algorithm will eventually erase the entire field, and recognize
that it has done so, and accept the input as a well order. This completes
the proof.
Since WO is well-known as a completeΠ11 set, we conclude as a corol-
lary that every Π11 set is infinite time decidable and hence also, every Σ11
set is infinite time decidable. But one can’t go much further in the projec-
tive hierarchy, because every semi-decidable set has complexity ∆12. For
a finer stratification, let me mention that the arithmetic sets are exactly
the sets which can be decided by an algorithm using a bounded finite
number of limits, and the hyperarithmetic sets, the ∆11 sets, are exactly
the sets which can be decided in some bounded recursive ordinal length
of time. Thus, the arithmetic sets are those that can be decided uniformly
in time before ω2, and the hyperarithmetic sets are exactly those which
can be decided uniformly in time before ωck1 .
Much of the classical computability theory generalizes to the super-
task context of infinite time Turing machines. For example, the s-m-n
theorem and the Recursion Theorem go through with virtually identical
proofs. But some other classical results, even very elementary ones, do
not generalize. One surprising result, for example, is the following.
Theorem 4. There is a non-computable function whose graph is semi-
decidable.
This follows from what I have called the Lost Melody Theorem [HL00,
Theorem 4.9], which asserts the existence of a real c such that { c } is
decidable, but c is not writable. Imagine the real c as the melody that
you can recognize when someone sings it, but you cannot sing it on your
own. Using such a lost melody real c, one can prove Theorem 4 with
the function f(x) = c. Indeed, since this function is constant and the
graph is decidable, the theorem can be strengthened to the assertion that
there is a non-computable constant function whose graph is decidable.
To give some idea of how one proves the Lost Melody Theorem, let me
mention that the real c will be the least real in the Go¨del constructible
universeL hierarchy that codes the ordinal supremum of the places where
all computations on input 0 have either halted or repeated. Since this
ordinal is above every writable ordinal, the real c cannot be writable. But
the real c codes enough information about itself so that an infinite time
Turing machine can verify that a given real is c or not.
Supertask Computation 11
4 How long do the computations take?
One naturally wants to understand how long a supertask computation
can take. Therefore, I define an ordinal α to be clockable if there is a
computation on input 0 that takes exactly α many steps to complete (so
that the αth step of computation is the act of moving to the halt state).
Such a computation is a clock of sorts, a way to count exactly up to α.
It is very easy to see that any finite n is clockable; one can simply
have a machine cycle through n states and then halt. The ordinal ω is
clockable, by the machine that halts whenever it sees the limit state. And
these same ideas show that if α is clockable, then so is α+ n and α+ ω.
Thus, every ordinal up to ω2 is clockable. The ordinal ω2 itself is clock-
able: one can recognize it as the first limit of limit ordinals, by flashing a
flag on and then off again every time the limit state is encountered. The
ordinal ω2 will be first time this flag is on at a limit stage. Going beyond
this, it is easy to see that if α and β are clockable, so are α + β and αβ.
Undergraduate students might enjoy finding algorithms to clock specific
ordinals, such as ωω2 , and I can recommend this as a way to help them
understand the ordinals more deeply.
Most readers will have guessed that the analysis extends much fur-
ther. In fact, any recursive ordinal is clockable. This can be seen by op-
timizing the count-through argument in Theorem 3. Specifically, after
writing a real coding a recursive ordinal on the tape in ω many steps,
one proceeds to count through it in an optimized fashion. Rather than
merely guessing the least element of the relation, one guesses the ω many
least elements of the relation (while simultaneously erasing the previous
guesses). In this way, each block of ω many steps of the algorithm will
erase ω many elements from the field of the relation.
Some have been surprised that the clockable ordinals extend beyond
the recursive ordinals, but in fact they extend well beyond the recursive
ordinals. To see at least the beginnings of this, let me show that the or-
dinal ωck1 + ω is clockable, where ωck1 is the supremum of the recursive
ordinals. Kleene has proved that there is a recursive relation whose well-
founded part has order type ωck1 . Consider the supertask algorithm that
writes this relation on the tape and then attempts to count through it. By
stage ωck1 the ill-founded part will have been reached, but it takes the al-
gorithm an additional ω many steps to realize this. So it can halt at stage
ωck1 + ω.
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One is left to wonder, is ωck1 itself clockable? More generally, Are
there gaps in the clockable ordinals? After all, if a child can count to
twenty-seven, then one might expect the child also to be able to count
to any smaller number, such as nineteen.2 The question is whether we
expect the same to be true for infinite time Turing machines.
Theorem 5. Gaps exist in the clockable ordinals.
Proof. Consider the algorithm which simulates all programs on input 0,
recording which have halted. When a stage is found at which no pro-
grams halt, then halt. This produces a clockable ordinal above a non-
clockable ordinal, so gaps exist.
The argument can be modified to show that the next gap above any
clockable ordinal has size ω. Other arguments establish that complicated
behavior can occur at limits of gaps, because the lengths of the gaps are
unbounded in the clockable ordinals.
Question 1. What is the structure of the clockable ordinals?
For example, one might wonder whether the first gap begins at ωck1 , the
supremum of the recursive ordinals? (It does, since no admissible ordinal
is clockable [HL00].)
There is another way for infinite time Turing machines to operate
as clocks, and this is by counting through a real coding a well order in
the manner of Theorem 3. To assist with this analysis, we define that a
real is writable if it is the output of a supertask computation on input 0.
An ordinal is writable if it is coded by a writable real. It is easy to see
that there are no gaps in the writable ordinals, because if one can write
down real coding α, it is an easy matter to write down from this a real
coding any particular β < α. In [HL00], Andy Lewis and I proved that
the order types of the clockable and writable ordinals are the same, but
the question was left open as to whether these two classes of ordinals had
the same supremum. This was solved by Philip Welch in [Wel], allowing
Andy Lewis and I to greatly simplify arguments in [HL].
2 Friends with children have informed me that such an expectation is unwarranted; one some-
times can’t get the child to stop at the right time. This reminds me of a time when my younger
brother was in kindergarten, the children all sat in a big circle taking turns saying the next
letter of the alphabet: A, B, C, and so on, around the circle in the manner of the usual song.
After the letter K, the next child contributed LMNOP, thinking that this was only one letter.
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Theorem 6. (Welch) Every clockable ordinal is writable. The supremum
of the writable and clockable ordinals is the same.
5 The supertask halting problems
Any notion of computation naturally provides a corresponding halting
problem, the question of whether a given computation will halt. In the
supertask context, we divide the halting problem into two parts, a bold-
face and a lightface problem:
H = { 〈 p, x 〉 | program p halts on input x }
h = { p | program p halts on input 0 }
In the classical theory, of course, these two sets are Turing equivalent,
but here the situation is different. Nevertheless, for undecidability the
classical arguments do directly generalize.
Theorem 7. The halting problems h and H are semi-decidable but not
decidable.
For semi-decidability, the point is that given a program p and input x
(or input 0), one can simply simulate p on x to see if it halts. If it does,
output the answer that yes, it halted; otherwise, keep simulating. For un-
decidability, in the case of H one can use the classical diagonalization
argument; for the lightface halting problem h, one appeals to the Recur-
sion Theorem, just as in the classical theory.
6 Oracles
There are two natural types of oracles to use in the infinite time Turing
machine context. On the one hand, one can use an individual real as an
oracle just as one does in the classical context, by simply adding an or-
acle tape containing this real, and allowing the machine to access this
tape during the computation. This corresponds exactly to adding an extra
input tape and thinking of the oracle real as a fixed additional input.
But this is ultimately not the right type of oracle to consider. Rather,
an oracle is more properly the same type of object as one that might
be decidable or semi-decidable, namely, a set of reals, not an individual
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real. Since such a set could be uncountable, we can’t expect to be able
to write out the entire contents of the oracle on an extra tape. Rather, we
provide an oracle model of relative computability by which the machine
can make arbitrary membership queries of the oracle. Specifically, for a
fixed oracle set of reals A, we equip an infinite time Turing machine with
an initially blank oracle tape on which the machine can read or write. By
attempting to switch to a special query state, the machine receives the
answer (by moving actually to the yes or no state) as to whether the real
currently written on the oracle tape is in A or not. In this way, the ma-
chine is able to ask, of any real x that it is capable of producing, whether
x ∈ A or not. This model of oracle computation has proven robust, and
it closely follows the well-known definition of L[A] in set theory, the
constructible universe relative to the predicate A, in which at any given
stage in the construction one is allowed to apply the predicate only to
previously constructed objects.
From the notion of oracle computation, one can of course define a
notion of relative computability. Specifically, the set A is computable
from B, written A ≤∞ B, if and only if A is supertask decidable using
oracle B. One then also defines A ≡∞ B if and only if A ≤∞ B and
B ≤∞ A, and this is the equivalence relation of the infinite time Turing
degrees. The strict version A <∞ B holds if and only if A ≤∞ B and
A 6≡∞ B.
7 Supertask Jump Operators
The two halting problems give rise of course to two jump operators.
Specifically, for any set A we have the boldface and lightface jumps:
AH = HA = { 〈 p, x 〉 | program p halts on input x with oracle A }
A▽ = A⊕ hA = A⊕ { p | program p halts on input 0 with oracle A }
We include the factor A explicitly in A▽, because in general A may not
be computable from hA. Indeed, there are some sets A that are not com-
putable from any real at all.
Jump Theorem 8 For any set, A <∞ A▽ <∞ AH.
To prove this theorem, one first observes that A ≤∞ A▽ ≤∞ AH, since
A is explicitly computable from A▽ and A▽ is merely the 0th slice of
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AH. Secondly, one knows that A <∞ A▽ because the undecidability of
the relativized halting problem means that hA is not computable from
A. The nontrivial aspect of this theorem is the assertion that A▽ <∞
AH. This assertion is what separates the two jump operators, and is the
reason that we know the two halting problems h ≡∞ 0▽ and H ≡∞ 0H
are not equivalent. This follows from the more specific result that the
set AH is not computable from A ⊕ z for any real z. In particular, 0H is
not computable from any real. In fact the boldface jumpH jumps much
higher than the lightface jump▽, and absorbs many iterates of the weaker
jump, since A▽H ≡∞ AH; indeed, for any ordinal α which is AH-writable,
A▽
(α)
H ≡∞ A
H (see [HL00]).
8 Post’s Problem for Supertasks
Post’s problem is the question in classical computability theory of whether
there are any non-decidable semi-decidable degrees strictly below the
halting problem, or equivalently, whether there are any intermediate semi-
decidable degrees between 0 and the Turing jump 0′. This question has a
natural supertask analogue:
Supertask Post’s Problem 9 Are there any intermediate semi-decidable
supertask degrees between 0 and the supertask jump 0▽?
The answer is delicately mixed. On the one hand, in the context of de-
grees in the real numbers, we have a negative answer. This contrasts
sharply with the classical theory.
Theorem 10. There are no reals z such that 0 <∞ z <∞ 0▽.
Proof. Suppose that 0 ≤∞ z ≤∞ 0▽. So z is the output of program p us-
ing 0▽ as an oracle. Consider the algorithm which computes approxima-
tions to 0▽, and uses program p with these approximations in an attempt
to produce z. If one of the proper approximations to 0▽ can successfully
produce z, then z is writable and 0 ≡∞ z. Conversely, if none of the
proper approximations can produce z, then on input z we can recognize
0▽ as the true approximation, the first approximation able to produce z.
So z ≡∞ 0▽.
On the other hand, when it comes to sets of reals, we have an affir-
mative answer.
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Theorem 11. There are semi-decidable sets of realsA with 0 <∞ A <∞
0▽. Indeed, there are incomparable semi-decidable sets A ⊥ B.
Please consult [HL00] for the proof. Let me mention here, though, that
the basic idea of the argument is to generalize the Friedburg-Munchnik
priority argument to the supertask context, much as Sacks’ did for α-
recursion theory. Building A and B in stages, we attempt to meet the
requirements
ϕBp 6= A and ϕ
A
p 6= B
by adding writable reals to A and B that have not yet appeared on the
higher priority computations. One technical fact to make this idea work
is that for any clockable ordinal α, there are many writable reals not
appearing during the course of any supertask computation of length α.
Thus, we can find a supply of new writable reals to add to A and B in
order to satisfy the later requirements, without injuring the witnessing
computations of earlier higher-priority requirements.
9 Other Models of Infinitary Computation
Let me briefly compare the infinite time Turing machine model of super-
task computation with some other well-known models.
The Blum-Shub-Smale machines (see [BSS89]) were the original in-
spiration for infinite time Turing machines.3 Programs and computations
for BSS machines are finite, but the basic units of computation are full
precision real numbers. They are in essence finite state register machines,
where the registers each hold a real number. The primary purpose of in-
troducing the BSS machines was to provide a theoretical foundation for
analyzing computational algorithms using the concepts of real analysis
rather than arithmetic. The machines allow one to analyze the dynamical
features, for example, of actual algorithms in numerical analysis, such as
Newton’s method, and illuminate questions of stability and convergence
for such algorithms. The classical approach to these problems, using the
Turing machine model with ever greater decimal approximations, forces
one into the realm of finite combinatorics, where one becomes lost in a
3 Jeff Kidder and I heard Lenore Blum’s lectures for the Berkeley Logic Colloquium in 1989,
and had the idea to generalize the Turing machine concept in a different direction: to infinite
time rather than infinite precision.
Supertask Computation 17
jumble of discrete approximation error analysis, when one would rather
fly smoothly above it in the heaven of differential equations.
In another direction, the theory of higher recursion provides a model
of infinitary computability by setting a very general theoretical context
for recursion on infinite objects, and one should expect many parallels
between it and the theory of infinite time Turing machines. The anony-
mous referee of [HL] and Philip Welch have pointed out, for example,
that the infinitary priority argument [HL, Theorem 4.1], stated as Theo-
rem 11 above, parallels Sacks’ version of the Friedburg-Munchnik proof
for α-recursion [Sac90], specifically when α is λ, the supremum of the
clockable ordinals. One can identify the writable reals in our argument
with the ordinal stages at which they appear and get Sacks’ sets, and con-
versely, Sacks’ could have written out codes for those stages and gotten
our sets. This identification reveals that the ≤∞-degree structure of sets
of writable reals below 0▽ is exactly that of the λ-degrees. Accordingly,
one can obtain not only the answer to Post’s problem, but all the theorems
from λ-recursion theory for this class of degrees, such as the Shore Den-
sity Theorem, etc., for free. It will be very interesting to see if these ideas
will allow one to prove the theorems in the general case of all degrees.
Lastly, let me mention quantum Turing machines, if only because I
am often asked about them in connection with infinite time Turing ma-
chines. Quantum Turing machines are like classical Turing machines,
except that the configuration of the machine at any given stage is a su-
perposition of classical configurations; the different components of these
superpositions, like the wave functions of quantum mechanics, may con-
structively or destructively interfere with one another as the computation
proceeds. By means of clever quantum algorithms, one can effectively
carry out parallel computation in these different components, construc-
tively interfering their output to assemble the information into a final
answer. In this way, quantum Turing machines allow for an exponential
increase in the speed of computation of many important functions. But
because quantum Turing machines, at the end of the day, are simulable
by classical Turing machines, they do not introduce new decidable sets or
new computable functions. And so while quantum Turing machines are
without a doubt extremely important in matters of computational feasi-
bility, they do not really provide a model of infinitary computability. Infi-
nite time Turing machines are simply much more powerful than quantum
Turing machines.
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10 Questions for the Future
I close this article by asking the open-ended question:
Question 2. What is the structure of infinite time Turing degrees? To
what extent do its properties mirror or differ from the classical structure?
This question really stands for the dozens of specific open questions that
one might ask: does the Sacks Density Theorem, for example, hold in the
supertask context for arbitrary sets of reals? The field is wide open.
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